# "A House Divided Against Itself Cannot Stand"

— Abraham Lincoln

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A reproduction of the exceedingly rare first separate printing of Abraham Lincoln's famous speech, from the copy in the Illinois State Historical Library.

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With an Introduction by
CLYDE C. WALTON
Illinois State Historian

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This copy of "A House Divided Against Itself . . ." is being sent to you as a membership bonus by your Illinois State Historical Society. It is the first publication in the Society's new pamphlet series and was issued on June 16 in commemoration of the one-hundredth anniversary of Lincoln's "House Divided" speech.

The pamphlet contains a facsimile reproduction of the first separate printing of the original speech, an extremely rare volume of which only three copies are known to exist.

Alexander Summers
PRESIDENT

P.S. Additional copies of the pamphlet may be obtained at 75 cents each from the Historical Society, Centennial Building, Springfield.

# Abraham Lincoln's "House Divided" Address

Delivered in Springfield, before the
Illinois State Republican Convention,
June 16, 1858.

A reproduction of the exceedingly rare first
separate printing, from the copy in the
Illinois State Historical Library.

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ILLINOIS STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY
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# "A House Divided Against Itself Cannot Stand"

## —Abraham Lincoln

The address delivered by Abraham Lincoln in Springfield, Illinois, the hot, humid evening of June 16, 1858, is generally known as the "House Divided" speech. The name comes from a phrase based on the Biblical passage, Mark 3:24-26, and which occurs at the very beginning of Lincoln's careful and studied address:

> If we could first know *where* we are, and *whither* we are tending, we could then better judge *what* to do, and *how* to do it. We are now far into the *fifth* year, since a policy was initiated, with the *avowed* object and *confident* promise, of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only, *not ceased*, but has *constantly augmented*.
>
> In *my* opinion, it *will* not cease, until a *crisis* shall have been reached, and passed. "A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this government cannot endure, permanently half *slave* and *half free*. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to *fall*—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become *all* one thing, or *all* the other.

Very likely these paragraphs caused Lincoln more trouble than anything else he ever said in public. This "House Divided" speech signaled the opening of the Lincoln-Douglas debates, and catapulted him into a position of national public political prominence. Although Lincoln held his own in these debates, Douglas was re-elected United States Senator from Illinois. Lincoln lost the race for the Senate seat in 1858, but was

elected President in 1860. Stephen A. Douglas did not realize—as we do now—that in winning his Senate seat he was irrevocably committed to a path which led away from the presidency.

Douglas attacked and Lincoln defended these famous phrases both before and after the debates. For example, in answering Douglas in Chicago on July 10, Lincoln stated:

". . . I did not say I was in favor of anything in it [the 'House Divided' speech]. I only said what I expected would take place. I made a prediction only—it may have been a foolish one perhaps." And in a Springfield speech delivered on July 17, he reiterated:

> Now you all see, from that quotation [the "House Divided" and extinction of slavery passages], I did not express my *wish* on anything. In that passage I indicated no wish or purpose of my own; I simply expressed my *expectation*. Cannot the Judge perceive the distinction between a *purpose* and an *expectation*. I have often expressed an expectation to die, but I have never expressed a *wish* to die.

The "House Divided" speech was carefully prepared by Lincoln to be delivered before the Illinois State Republican Convention. The political situation in Illinois was such that the young and vigorous Republican party had reason to hope for a victory in the coming fall elections. The Democratic party was split into two factions, one of which followed the leadership of Stephen A. Douglas, the other the President of the United States, James Buchanan. Republican hopes for success in the fall were based on this division in the opposition party. Since, in 1858, United States Senators were elected by members of the state legislature, Lincoln and Douglas would campaign for the election of legislators whom they felt would vote for them.

From the Missouri Compromise of 1820 to the Civil War, the general question of the extension of slavery to the territories kept the political pot boiling. With the acquisition of additional land at the conclusion of the Mexican War, the problem of slavery extension became acute. The Wilmot Proviso, the Compromise of 1850, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, "popular sovereignty," the Dred Scott Decision—all were significant steps leading to a national tragedy. The Kansas-Nebraska Act was the signal for political realignment, and the old Whig party broke up and the Republican party was born; Illinois elected its first Republican state administration in 1856. North and South colonized in Kansas, and both sides committed lawless acts of guerrilla warfare. When President Buchanan tried to have Kansas admitted to the Union by ramming a proslavery constitution through the Congress, Douglas angrily broke away from the national leadership of the Democratic party. Buchanan threatened to purge the

"Little Giant" and Douglas knew he had to fight not only the Republicans, but his own party, to win re-election to the Senate.

Lincoln had hoped to go to the Senate in 1855, but had not been able to get quite enough votes in the legislature. To prevent the election of Democrat Joel A. Matteson, he released his votes to Lyman Trumbull, and with these votes Trumbull was elected. Senator Trumbull was not a man to forget, and on January 3, 1858, wrote a letter pledging to support Lincoln for the Senate:

> . . . I have written you freely & just as I felt & presume it is unnecessary for me to assure you that I shall continue to labor for the success of the Republican cause in Ills. & the advancement at the next election to the place now occupied by Douglas of that *Friend*, who was so instrumental in promoting my own—
>
> Yours very truly
>
> Lyman Trumbull
>
> My wife who is sitting by me says you are too modest to understand whom I mean by "*that friend*," but he who magnanimously requested his friends just at the right moment to cast their votes for me, & without which I could not have been elected will, I think understand it.

While he had the support of Trumbull and the other Illinois Republicans in Congress, Lincoln had other opposition to overcome. First, "Long John" Wentworth, colorful Chicago political boss, had to be discouraged. Wentworth, a shrewd campaigner, soon recognized, however, the strength of Lincoln's supporters and denied publicly all senatorial aspirations. Perhaps more important was the very vocal Horace Greeley, who suggested that Douglas merited Republican support because he had acted as would a Republican in the Kansas crisis, and because Greeley wished to widen the schism in the Democratic party. Disturbed by Greeley's fulsome praise of Douglas, Lincoln expressed his feelings in a December 28, 1857 letter to Trumbull:

> What does the New-York Tribune mean by it's constant eulogising, and admiring, and magnifying Douglas? Does it, in this, speak the sentiments of the republicans at Washington? Have they concluded that the republican cause, generally, can be best promoted by sacrificing us here in Illinois? If so we would like to know it soon; it will save us a great deal of labor to surrender at once.
>
> As yet I have heard of no republican here going over to Douglas; but if the Tribune continues to din his praises into the ears of it's five or ten thousand republican readers in Illinois, it is more than can be hoped that all will stand firm.

Perhaps inspired by Greeley, Ozias M. Hatch, Illinois' Republican Secretary of State, tested party leaders on the subject of Lincoln or Douglas.

Most answered that Douglas would be welcomed into the Republican party "... *As a full private*, in *the rear rank*—" On April 20 Gustavus Koerner, recent Lieutenant Governor of Illinois, wrote:

> Looking at our situation here . . . I am of opinion, that the Republicans take their own course. Without offending or abusing unnecessarily the Douglasites we ought to make no overtures. We must make them understand, that *Lincoln* is our man, that we will try every means to elect men favorable to him. It seems to me advisable to have that understanding as early as possible. To have a name to rally round at the commencement of a struggle is worth thousands of votes. We can carry our County for Lincoln with a death certainty.

The Republican press rallied behind Lincoln, fighting Greeley and reprinting such items as the results of county conventions, for many of them endorsed Lincoln for the Senate. The most interesting of these resolutions was that of McLean County:

> *Resolved*, That the Hon. A. Lincoln is our *first*, *last* and *only* choice for the vacancy soon to occur in the United States Senate; and that despite all influences at home or abroad, domestic or foreign, the Republicans of Illinois, as with the voice of one man, are unalterably so resolved; to the end, that we may have a *big man*, with a *big mind*, and a *big heart* to represent our *big state*.

Meanwhile, Buchanan sought to purge Douglas by removing Illinois Democrats recommended for federal jobs by Douglas and replacing them with men pledged to fight against Douglas. United States marshals, attorneys and postmasters lost their jobs, and their Buchanan replacements prepared to set up opposition tickets in some counties. Buchanan, however, had blundered badly in underestimating Douglas' popular appeal, and Douglas remained the choice of the Democratic party in Illinois.

Lincoln, of course, had known that he would be endorsed by the state convention. It was a surprise to no one when Charles L. Wilson of Cook County, introduced the following resolution "... which was greeted with shouts of applause, and unanimously adopted:

"*Resolved*, that Abraham Lincoln is the first and only choice of the Republicans of Illinois for the United States Senate, as the successor of Stephen A. Douglas."

This resolution was, interestingly, a straight step toward our present system of direct election of United States Senators.

That Lincoln very carefully prepared his speech before the state con-

vention is well known. He made notes—as ideas came to mind—and kept them in his hat, and finally assembled them into a complete manuscript.

When he was interrupted in his writing by Jesse K. Dubois, who asked what he was doing, Lincoln is reported to have snapped: "It's none of your d----d business." Lincoln read the speech to his law partner, William H. Herndon, a few days before the convention, and to a group of his friends in the Statehouse Library the night before it was delivered. Herndon reported that:

> Some condemned it and not one endorsed it. One man, more forcible than elegant, characterized it as a "d----d fool utterance;" another said the doctrine was "ahead of its time;" and still another contended that it would drive away a good many voters fresh from the Democrats ranks. Each man attacked it in his criticism.

Lincoln had used the "House Divided" phrases at least twice before June 16, 1858—once in a letter to George Robertson of Lexington, Kentucky, on August 15, 1855:

> Our political problem now is "Can we, as a nation, continue together *permanently—forever*—half slave, and half free?" The problem is too mighty for me. May God, in his mercy, superintend the solution.

And in a speech believed to have been delivered in Edwardsville, Illinois, on May 18, 1858, Lincoln expressed himself this way:

> I believe the government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I expressed this belief a year ago [there is no surviving record of Lincoln's use of these phrases in 1857]; and subsequent developments have but confirmed me. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved. I do not expect the house to fall; but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and put it in course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new.

Horace White, a *Chicago Tribune* reporter, stated that after Lincoln read the "House Divided" speech to the state convention, he, at Lincoln's request, took the manuscript to the *Illinois State Journal* office to read proof. Lincoln also visited the *Journal* office that evening and read proof in the composing room. White reports that ". . . he had taken a great deal of pains with this speech, and [he said] that he wanted it to go before the people just as he had prepared it." The speech appeared in the June 18 issue of the *Illinois State Journal*, and was reprinted—with the proceedings of the convention—shortly afterward.

More than twenty newsmen representing out of town papers had attended the convention, and among these was C. W. Waite, the editor of the Sycamore (Illinois) *True Republican*. Waite, a stanch Republican and enthusiastic Lincolnian, printed the speech in the June 29 issue of his paper. Using this setting of type, he reprinted the speech as a 3½ by 5¼ inch sixteen-page pamphlet, the first single and separate publication of one of Lincoln's most significant addresses. For those interested in the early printings of the "House Divided" speech, Paul Angle's article "Four Lincoln Firsts" (*Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America*, volume 36, first quarter, 1942, pages 1-17) is highly recommended.

Since Lincoln corrected the proofs of the speech before it appeared in the *Illinois State Journal*, that publication of the text is generally conceded to be most nearly correct, although he used the speech as reported in the *Chicago Daily Tribune* in preparing a scrapbook version of the Lincoln-Douglas Debates which was published in 1860. The text in this Sycamore pamphlet has minor variations in capitalization, spelling and the use of italics. A few lines on page 10 and one line on page 11 were inadvertently omitted by the compositor. All in all, however, the text is remarkably close to the speech as it appeared in the *Illinois State Journal*. Comparison with the best text (Roy P. Basler, editor; Marion Dolores Pratt and Lloyd A. Dunlap, assistant editors, *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1953, volume 2, pages 461-469) indicates many minor errors, but few serious discrepancies.

At any rate, here is an exceedingly rare pamphlet—the first separate publication of the "House Divided" speech.

# SPEECH

OF

# HON. ABRAM LINCOLN,

BEFORE THE

## REPUBLICAN STATE CONVENTION

June 16, 1858.

"The result is not doubtful. We shall not fail—if we stand firm, we shall not fail."

---

Sycamore.
O. F. BASSETT, PR., TRUE REPUBLICAN OFFICE
1858.

SPEECH OF

# ABRAM LINCOLN.

If we could first know *where* we are, and *whither* we are tending, we could then better judge *what* to do, and *how* to do it.

We are now far into the *fifth* year, since a policy was initiated with the *avowed* object, and *confident* promise, of putting an end to slavery agitation.

Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only *not ceased*, but has *constantly augmented*.

In *my* opinion, it *will* not cease, until a *crisis* shall have been reached, and passed.

"A house divided against itself cannot stand."

I believe this Government cannot endure, permanently, half *slave* and half *free*.

I do not expect the Union to be *dissolved*—I don't expect the house to *fall*—but I *do* expect it will cease to be divided.

It will become *all* one thing, or *all* the other.

Either the *opponents* of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction; or its *advocates* will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in *all* the States, *old* as well as *new*—*North* as well as *South*.

Have we no *tendency* to the latter condition?

Let any one who doubts, carefully contemplate that now almost complete legal combination—piece of *machinery* so to speak—compounded of the Nebraska doctrine, and the Dred Scott decision. Let him consider not only *what work* the machinery is adapted to do, and *how well* adapted; but also let him study the *history* of its construction, and trace, if he can, or rather *fail*, if he can, to trace, the evidences of design, and concert of action among its chief bosses, from the beginning.

But, so far, *Congress* only had acted; and an *indorsement* by the people, *real* or *apparent*, was indispensable to *save* the point already gained, and give chance for more.

The new year of 1854 found slavery excluded from more than half the States by State Constitutions, and from most of the national territory by Congressional prohibition.

Four days later commenced the struggle, which ended in repealing that Congressional prohibition.

This opened all the national territory to slavery; and was the first point gained.

This necessity had not been overlooked, but had been provided for, as well as might be, in the notable argument of "*squatter sovereignty*," otherwise called "*sacred right of self-government*," which latter phrase, though

expressive of the only rightful basis of any government, was so perverted in this attempted use of it as to amount to just this: That if any *one* man chose to enslave *another*, no *third* man shall be allowed to object.

That argument was incorporated into the Nebraska bill itself, in the language which follows: "It being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor exclude it therefrom; but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States."

Then opened the roar of loose declamation in favor of "squatter sovereignty," and the "sacred right of self-government."

"But," said opposition members, "let us be more *specific*—let us *amend* the bill so as to expressly declare that the people of the Territory *may* exclude slavery." "Not we," said the friends of the measure, and down they voted the amendment.

While the Nebraska bill was passing through Congress, a *late case*, involving the question of a negro's freedom by reason of his owner having voluntarily taken him first into a free State and then into a Territory covered by Congressional prohibition, and held him as a slave for a long time in each, was passing through the United States Circuit Court for the District of Missouri, and both

Nebraska bill and law suit were brought to a decision in the same month of May, 1854. The negro's name was "Dred Scott," which name now designates the decision finally made in the case.

*Before* the *then* next Presidential election, the law case came *to* and was argued *in* the Supreme Court of the United States, but the *decision* of it was deferred until *after* the election. Still, *before* the election, Senator Trumbull, on the floor of the Senate, requests the leading advocate of the Nebraska bill to state *his opinion* whether the people of a Territory can constitutionally exclude slavery from their limits, and the latter answers, "That is a question for the Supreme Court."

The election came. Mr. Buchanan was elected, and the *indorsement*, such as it was, secured. That was the *second* point gained. The indorsement, however, fell short of a clear popular majority by nearly four hundred thousand votes, and so, perhaps, was not overwhelmingly reliable and satisfactory.

The *outgoing* President, in his last annual message, as impressively as possible *echoed back* upon the people the *weight* and *authority* of the indorsement.

The Supreme Court met again; *did not* announce their decision, but ordered a re-argument.

The Presidential inauguration came, and still no decision of the court; but the *incom-*

*ing* President, in his inaugural address, fervently exhorted the people to abide by the forthcoming decision, *whatever it might be.*

Then, in a few days, came the decision.

The reputed author of the Nebraska bill finds an early occasion to make a speech at this Capitol indorsing the Dred Scott decision, and vehemently denouncing all opposition to it.

The new President, too, seizes the early occasion of the Silliman letter to indorse and strongly censure that decision, and to express his astonishment that any different view had ever been entertained.

At length a squabble springs up between the President and the author of the Nebraska bill, on the mere question of *fact*, whether the Lecompton Constitution was or was not, in any just sense, made by the people of Kansas; and in that squabble the latter declares that all he wants is a fair vote of the people, and that he *cares* not whether slavery be voted *down* or voted *up*. I do not understand his declaration that he cares not whether slavery be voted down or voted up, to be intended by him other than as an *apt definition* of the *policy* he would impress upon the public mind—the *principle* for which he declares he has suffered much, and is ready to suffer to the end.

And well may he cling to that principle. If he has any parental feeling, well may he

cling to it. That principle is the only *shred* left of his original Nebraska doctrine. Under the Dred Scott decision, "squatter sovereignty" squatted out of existence, tumbled down like temporary scaffolding—like the mould at the foundry, served through one blast and fell back into loose sand—helped to carry one election, and then was kicked to the winds. His last *joint* struggle with the Republicans, against the Lecompton Constitution, involves nothing of the original Nebraska doctrine. That struggle was made on a point, the right of a people to make their own Constitution, upon which he and the Republicans have never differed.

The several points of the Dred Scott decision, in connection with Senator Douglas's "care not" policy, constitute the piece of machinery in its *present* state of advancement.

The *working* points of that machinery are:

First, that no negro slave, imported as such from Africa, and no descendant of such slave, can ever be a *citizen* of any State, in the sense of that term as used in the Constitution of the United States.

This point is made in order to deprive the negro, in every possible event, of the benefit of this provision of the United States Constitution, which declares that—

"The citizens of each State shall be en-

titled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."

Secondly, that "subject to the Constitution of the United States," neither *Congress* nor a *Territorial Legislature* can exclude slavery from any United States territory.

This point is made in order that individual men may *fill up* the Territories with slaves, without danger of losing them as property, and thus to enhance the chances of *permanency* to the institution through all the future.

Thirdly, That whether the holding a negro in actual slavery in a free State, makes him free, as against the holder, the United States Courts will not decide, but will leave to be decided by the courts of any slave State the negro may be forced into by the master.

This point is made, not to be pressed *immediately*; but, if acquiesced in for a while, and apparently *indorsed* by the people at an election, *then* to sustain the logical conclusion that what Dred Scott's master might lawfully do with Dred Scott in the free State of Illinois, every other master may lawfully do with any other one or one *thousand* slaves, in Illinois or in any other free State.

Auxiliary to all this, and working hand in hand with it, the Nebraska doctrine, or what is left of it, is to *educate* and *mould* public opinion, at least *Northern* public opinion, to

not *care* whether slavery is voted *down* or voted *up*.

This shows exactly where we now *are*; and *partially* also, whither we are tending.

It will throw additional light on the latter, to go back, and run the mind over the string of historical facts already stated. Several things will *now* appear less *dark* and *mysterious* than they did *when* they were transpiring. The people were to be left "perfectly free," "subject only to the Constitution." What the *Constitution* had to do with it, outsiders could not then see. Plainly enough *now*, it was an exactly fitted *niche* for the Dred Scott decision to afterwards come in, and declare that *perfect freedom* of the people to be just no freedom at all.

Why was the amendment expressly declaring the right of the people to exclude slavery, voted down? Plainly enough *now*, the adoption of it would have spoiled the niche for the Dred Scott decision.

Why was the court decision held up?—Why even a Senator's individual opinion withheld, till *after* the Presidential election? Plainly enough *now*, the speaking out *then* would have damaged the "*perfectly free*" argument upon which the election was to be carried.

Why the *outgoing* President's *advance* exhortation in favor of the decision?

These things *look* like the cautious *patting*

and *petting* a spirited horse, preparatory to mounting him, when it is dreaded that he may give the rider a fall.

And why the hasty after-indorsements of the decision by the President and others?

We can not absolutely *know* that all these exact adaptations are the result of a pre-concert. But when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we know have been gotten out at different times and places and by different workmen—Stephen, Franklin, Roger and James for instance—and when we see these timbers joined together, and see they exactly make the frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons and mortices exactly fitting, and all the lengths and proportions of the different pieces, and not a piece too many or too few—not omitting even scaffolding—or, if a single piece be lacking we can see the place in the frame exactly fitted and prepared to yet bring such piece in—in *such* a case, we find it impossible to not *believe* that Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all understood one another from the beginning, and all worked upon a common *plan* or *draft* drawn up before the first lick was struck.

It should not be overlooked that, by the Nebraska bill, the people of a *State* as well as *Territory* were to be left "*perfectly free*," "*subject only to the Constitution.*"

Why mention a *State?* They were legis-

lating for *Territories*, and not for or about States. Certainly the people of a *State are* and *ought to be* subject to the Constitution of the United States; but why is mention of this *lugged* into this merely *territorial* law? Why are the people of a *Territory* and the people of a *State* therein *lumped* together, and their relation to the Constitution therein treated as being *precisely* the same?

While the opinion of *the Court*, by Chief Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case, and the separate opinions of all the concurring Judges, expressly declare that the Constitution of the United States neither permits Congress nor a Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery from any United States Territory, they all omit to declare whether or not the same Constitution permits a *State*, or the people of a State, to exclude it.

*Possibly*, this was a mere *omission*; but who can be *quite* sure, if McLean or Curtis had sought to get into the opinion a declaration of unlimited power in the people of a *State* to exclude slavery from their limits, just as Chase and Mace sought to get such a declaration, in behalf of the people of a Territory, into the Nebraska bill—I ask, who can be quite *sure* that it would not have been voted down in the one case, as it had been in the other.

The nearest approach to the point of declaring the power of a State over slavery is

made by Judge Nelson. He approaches it more than once, using the precise idea, and almost the language too, of the Nebraska act. On one occasion his exact language is, "except in cases where the power is restrained by the Constitution of the United States, the law of the State is supreme over the subject of slavery within its jurisdiction."

In what *cases* the power of the *States is* so restrained by the United States Constitution, is left an *open* question, precisely as the same question, as to the restraint on the power of the *Territories*, was left open in the Nebraska act. Put *that* and *that* together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may, ere long, see filled with another Supreme Court decision, declaring that the Constitution of the United States does not permit a *State* to exclude slavery from its limits.

And this may especially be expected if the doctrine of "care not whether slavery be voted *down* or *up*," shall gain upon the public mind sufficiently to give promise that such a decision can be maintained when made.

Such a decision is all that slavery now lacks of being alike lawful in all the States.

Welcome or unwelcome, such decision is probably coming, and will soon be upon us, unless the power of the present political dynasty shall be met and overthrown.

We shall *lie down* pleasantly dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of

making their State free; and we shall *awake* to the reality instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a Slave State.

To meet and overthrow the power of that dynasty, is the work now before all those who would prevent that consummation.

That is *what* we have to do.

But *how* can we best do it?

There are those who denounce us *openly*, to their *own* friends, and yet whisper *us softly* that *Senator Douglas* is the *aptest* instrument there is with which to effect that object. *They* do *not* tell us, nor has *he* told us, that he *wishes* any such object to be effected. They wish us to *infer* all, from the facts, that he now has a little quarrel with the present head of the dynasty; and that he has regularly voted with us, on a single point, upon which he and we have never differed.

They remind us that *he* is a very *great man*, and that the largest of *us* are very small ones. Let this be granted. But "a *living dog* is better than a *dead lion*." Judge Douglas, if not a *dead* lion *for this work*, is at least a *caged* and *toothless* one. How can he oppose the advances of slavery? He don't *care* anything about it. His avowed *mission is impressing* the "public heart" to *care* nothing about it.

A leading Douglas Democratic newspaper thinks Douglas's superior talent will be needed

to resist the revival of the African slave trade.

Does Douglas believe an effort to revive that trade is approaching? He has not said so. Does he really think so? But if it is, how can he resist it? For years he has labored to prove it a sacred right of white men to take negro slaves into the new Territories. Can he possibly show that it is a less sacred right to buy them where they can be bought the cheapest? And, unquestionably, they can be bought cheaper in Africa, than in Virginia.

He has done all in his power to reduce the whole question of slavery to one of a mere right of property—and as such how can he oppose the foreign slave trade—how can he refuse that trade in that "property" shall be "perfectly free"—unless he does it as a protection to the home production? And as the home producers will probably not ask the protection, he will be wholly without a ground of opposition.

Senator Douglas holds, we know, that a man may rightfully be *wiser to-day* than he was *yesterday*—that he may rightfully *change* when he finds himself wrong.

But can we, for that reason, run ahead, and *infer* that he *will* make any particular change, of which he, himself, has given no intimation? Can we *safely* base *our* action upon any such *vague* inference?

Now, as ever, I wish to not *misrepresent* Judge Douglas's *position*, question his *motives*, or do aught that can be personally offensive to him.

Whenever, *if ever*, he and we can come together on *principle*, so that *our great cause* may have assistance from *his great ability*, I hope to have interposed no adventitious obstacle.

But clearly, he is not *now* with us—he does not *pretend* to be—he does not *promise* to *ever* be.

Our cause, then, must be intrusted to, and conducted by, its own undoubted friends—those whose hands are free, whose hearts are in the work—who *do care* for the result.

Two years ago the Republicans of the nation mustered over 1,300,000 strong.

We did this under the single impulse of resistance to a common danger, with every external circumstance against us.

Of *strange*, *discordant*, and even *hostile* elements, we gathered from the four winds, and *formed* and fought the battle through under the constant hot fire of a disciplined, proud and pampered enemy.

Did we brave all *then* to *falter* now?—*now*, when that same enemy is *wavering*, dissevered and belligerent?

The result is not doubtful. We shall not fail—if we stand firm, we shall not fail.

*Wise counsels* may *accelerate* or *mistakes delay* it, but sooner or later the victory is sure to come.